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No Pay No Play: Not Okay? Analyzing 
the Constitutionality of Missouri’s No 




In November 2018, the United States District Court in Western Missouri decided 
the case of Jiles v. Schuster Co., holding that Missouri’s No Pay No Play statute 
was unconstitutional in that it placed a cap on non-economic damages. Missouri’s 
No Pay No Play statute requires that uninsured motorists (specifically the driver of 
the vehicle) waive the right to collect non-economic damages from a driver who 
has insurance in the case of an accident, even when the insured driver is the one at 
fault. In his order, Judge Bough relied on Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs. to find 
the No Pay No Play statute violated Missouri’s constitution in that it infringed on 
the right to a trial by jury. The Missouri Supreme Court has yet to decide on the 
constitutionality of the No Pay No Play statute, but a few state trial courts have 
already found the statute unconstitutional, using similar logic as Judge Bough ap-
plies in Jiles v. Schuster Co. The reasoning those courts have found the No Pay No 
Play statute unconstitutional is that the courts construe it as a statutory cap on dam-
ages, which Missouri has already determined violated the right to a trial by jury. 
Missouri is not the first state to find that statutory caps on damages are unconstitu-
tional but it is the first to apply this principle to the No Pay No Play statute. Thus, 
Missouri stands at a precipice, and any future decision in its highest court may have 
a domino effect on other states. 
 
This article analyzes the effects of Jiles v. Schuster Co. by looking at the case gov-
erning the decision, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs. Evidence suggests Missouri 
has not historically upheld the “inviolate” right to a jury determination of damages, 
as established in that case, and thus casts doubt on the final decision reached in 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs. In Watts, the Supreme Court of Missouri found 
that statutory caps on non-economic damages stemming from medical malpractice 
were unconstitutional. Recent cases, such as Jiles, support the conclusion that the 
No Pay No Play statute falls within the same purview and likely is a violation of the 
Missouri Constitution. However, No Pay No Play could survive the challenge due 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite a Missouri Statute that requires drivers of motor vehicles to carry motor 
vehicle insurance,1 more than $107 million was paid out by insurance companies 
due to injuries caused by uninsured motorists in 2017 alone.2 This has been a con-
sistent problem for Missouri and many other states.3 Missouri, and other states, have 
attempted to rid the problem of uninsured motorists by allowing the state to suspend 
the license of a person who is caught driving without the proper car insurance.4 
Additionally, Missouri has also made driving without motor vehicle insurance a 
misdemeanor offense.5 However, driving without motor vehicle insurance is com-
mon; in fact, nearly 14% of all drivers on Missouri roads in 2009 did not have in-
surance.6 In response to this problem, the Missouri legislature enacted a statute in 
2013 aimed at reducing the amount of uninsured motorists on Missouri roads, af-
fectionately known as “No Pay No Play.”7 This statute requires uninsured motorists 
(specifically the driver of the vehicle) to waive the right to collect non-economic 
damages from a driver who has proper insurance in the case of an accident, even 
when the insured driver is the one at fault.8 
The Missouri No Pay No Play statute went unchallenged until 2017, when 
Joshua Gilmore, an uninsured motorist, brought a cause of action against Katherine 
Page.9 In Gilmore v. Page, Katherine Page attempted to pursue an affirmative de-
fense under Missouri’s No Pay No Play statute.10 However, before dismissing the 
case, Judge Robert Koffman issued an order stating that No Pay No Play violated 
Missouri’s Constitutional right to trial by jury, and thus the statute had to be struck 
down.11 In his order, Judge Koffman cited Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers 
as the authority for his decision.12 In Watts, the Missouri Supreme Court found that 
statutory caps on non-economic damages breached the “inviolate” right to trial by 
jury in Missouri’s Constitution.13 Judge Koffman dismissed the case in Gilmore v. 
Page14 and there was no appeal.  In the years following Gilmore v. Page, there have 
been additional decisions in Missouri state trial courts that have reached the same 
conclusion,15 although no challenge has yet reached Missouri’s highest court.16  
 
 1. See MO. REV. STAT. § 303.025 - § 303.041 (2019). 
 2. Private Passenger Automobile Insurance: A Review of the Market in Missouri, MISSOURI 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATION (July 2018), 
https://insurance.mo.gov/reports/documents/PrivatePassengerAutomobileInsuranceInMOrev7-11-
2017.pdf [hereinafter MO Insurance Market Review]. 
 3. See One in Eight Drivers: Countrywide Rate Increases as Several States Experience Significant 
Decrease, INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.insurance-research.org/sites/de-
fault/files/downloads/UMNR1005.pdf 
 4. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.041 (2019). 
 5. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.025 (2019). 
 6. Recession Marked by Bump in Uninsured Motorists, INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (April 21, 
2011), https://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/IRCUM2011_042111.pdf. 
 7. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.390 (2019). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Gilmore v. Page, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 14. Gilmore v. Page, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017). 
 15. Howard v. Mulkins, No. 1716-CV08520 (Oct. 17, 2018). 
 16. See Gilmore, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017); Howard, No. 1716-CV08520 (Oct. 17, 2018). 
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However, the state issue reached the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri in Jiles v. Schuster Co.17 In deciding this case, Judge Stephen 
Bough used analysis from Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers (as did state trial 
courts) to determine that No Pay No Play violates Missouri’s Constitutional right 
to trial by jury.18 
This article analyzes the effects of Jiles v. Schuster Co. by looking at the case 
governing the decision, Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs. Part II of this article ad-
dresses Missouri’s No Pay No Play statute and its similarities to statutes in other 
states . Additionally, this section will review the number of states that have allowed 
statutory caps on non-economic damages and how many states have found them 
unconstitutional; particular focus will be on the states that find them to be a viola-
tion of the right to ‘trial by jury’ (the same rationale that was used in Watts). In 
doing this, the section will review the Missouri Constitution’s text regarding trial 
by jury. Part III of this article reviews the rationale behind Watts v. Lester E. Cox 
Medical Centers in finding that statutory caps on non-economic damages are un-
constitutional because these caps breach the right to trial by jury. Part IV of this 
article challenges the rationale underlying the Watts decision, in which the court 
indicated that since statutory caps did not exist when the Missouri Constitution was 
ratified in 1820, they cannot be valid today. This section addresses potential flaws 
in this idea, focusing on historical inaccuracies as well as the notion that the people 
of Missouri already recognized one way to limit damages decided by a jury in 1820, 
judicial remittitur. Part V applies the Watts analysis to No Pay No Play and finds 
that it is likely unconstitutional, as well. However, the section addresses how, even 
if found unconstitutional in its current form, Missouri’s No Pay No Play statute may 
survive with only minor changes. 
II.     MISSOURI V. OTHER STATES – NO PAY NO PLAY & CAPS ON 
NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES 
Most states require that drivers of motor vehicles possess a certain amount of 
insurance.19 In Missouri, that minimum is $25,000 for bodily injury per person 
($50,000 per accident), $25,000 per accident for property damage, and uninsured 
motorist coverage of $25,000 for bodily injury ($50,000 per accident).20 The ra-
tionale for requiring insurance is to ensure that “automobile accident victims are not 
left without a means to recover for their injuries from a judgment-proof tortfea-
sor.”21 Missouri is not the only state to have No Pay No Play statutes to aid in this 
goal. In fact, there are currently ten other states that have similar laws: Alaska,22 
 
 17. Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 908 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 18. Id. at 916. 
 19. See e.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.4 (Deering 2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 
500.3135(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2020); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-25 (2019). 
 20. Motor Vehicle Insurance (Financial Responsibility), MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 
https://dor.mo.gov/drivers/insurinfo.php (last visited April 20, 2020). 
 21. Caviglia v. Royals Tours of America, 842 A.2d 125, 129 (N.J. 2004). 
 22. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.320 (2019). 
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California,23 Indiana,24 Iowa,25 Kansas,26 Louisiana,27 Michigan,28 New Jersey,29 
North Dakota,30 and Oregon.31 Most of these states’ laws contain similar language 
to Missouri’s No Pay No Play Statute, which reads: 
1. An uninsured motorist shall waive the ability to have a cause of action or 
otherwise collect for noneconomic loss against a person who is in compliance with 
the financial responsibility laws of this chapter due to a motor vehicle accident in 
which the insured driver is alleged to be at fault… 
Such waiver shall not apply if it can be proven that the accident was 
caused, in whole or in part, by a tort-feasor who operated a motor vehicle 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or who is convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter… 
2. The provisions of this section shall not apply to an uninsured motorist whose 
immediately previous insurance policy meeting the requirements of section 
303.190 was terminated or nonrenewed for failure to pay the premium, unless no-
tice of termination or nonrenewal for failure to pay such premium was provided by 
such insurer at least six months prior to the time of the accident.32 
Note that that in most of these states, the waiver applies strictly to non-eco-
nomic damages. There are limitations to the application of the statute, including 
when the insured person was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or in the act of 
committing a felony, still permit recovery of these damages in certain situations.33 
Louisiana is a unique state in that it bars the uninsured motorist from receiving the 
first $15,000 in bodily injury and the first $25,000 in property damages, anything 
beyond this ceiling can be recovered.34 In Michigan, all damages are barred from 
recovery.35 
In these ten states, challenges to the constitutionality of their No Pay No Play 
statutes are not uncommon.36 In both Louisiana and New Jersey, courts found their 
No Pay No Play statutes constitutional.37 In Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court ruled against a challenge to the No Pay No Play statute 
where the plaintiff argued the statute was excessive and violated Louisiana’s Con-
stitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment.38 In upholding the 
 
 23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333.4 (Deering 2020). 
 24. See IND. CODE § 34-30-29.2-1 (2020); IND. CODE § 34-30-29.2-2 (2020). 
 25. IOWA CODE § 613.20 (2019). 
 26. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3130 (2020). 
 27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:866 (2019). 
 28. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 29. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4.5 (2020). 
 30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-25 (2019). 
 31. OR. REV. STAT. § 31.715 (2020). 
 32. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.390 (2019); see also e.g.  ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.320 (2019); IOWA CODE 
§ 613.2; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3130 (2020). 
 33. See e.g. MO. REV. STAT. § 303.390; IND. CODE § 34-30-29.2-2 (2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
3130; OR. REV. STAT. § 31.715. 
 34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:866 (2019). 
 35. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2020) It is worth noting that Michigan 
is a true ‘no fault’ state when it comes to motor vehicle accidents, complicating the issue, and causing 
for what seems like a draconian statute. 
 36. See e.g. Progressive Sec. Ins. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675 (La. 1998); Caviglia v. Royals Tours of 
America, 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004); Montgomery v. Potter, 341 P. 3d 660 (Ok. 2014). 
 37. Progressive Sec. Ins., 711 So. 2d at 694; Caviglia, 842 A.2d at 137. 
 38. Progressive Sec. Ins., 711 So. 2d at 680-82. 
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statute, the court emphasized that uninsured motorists were in violation of the law 
and that driving is a privilege, not a right.39 Additionally, the Louisiana Supreme 
Court further indicated that the government is not the beneficiary, thus the limita-
tions placed by the legislature do not amount to a punishment.40 In response to the 
subsequent challenge on grounds that No Pay No Play violates Equal Protection 
(under both Louisiana’s Constitution and the U.S. Constitution) the court identified 
that while the statute did classify a group of people, it was only to a level that re-
quired the lowest level of scrutiny.41 The court upheld their No Pay No Play statute 
on the grounds that there was legitimate government interest in enforcing the insur-
ance requirements as well as addressing the high cost of insurance due to these un-
insured motorists.42 Similarly, New Jersey upheld their No Pay No Play statute on 
due process grounds, holding that the statute does not implicate a fundamental right 
and it furthers a legitimate state interest.43 
In fact, so far only one state has found No Pay No Play statutes unconstitutional 
when the issue reached a state’s supreme court.44 In Montgomery v. Potter, the Ok-
lahoma Supreme Court dealt with a challenge claiming No Pay No Play violated a 
section of Oklahoma’s Constitution that required the legislature to treat all people 
the same as it pertained to the rules of evidence.45 The court found that No Pay No 
Play statutes inevitably created a different class of individuals and held them to a 
much stricter standard than others in automobile negligence cases, thus violating 
that section of the Oklahoma Constitution.46 None of the challenges to No Pay No 
Play statutes in other states have centered around the right to trial by jury,47 as it did 
in Jiles v. Schuster Co. and its predecessors.48 
While there have been relatively few explicit challenges to No Pay No Play 
statutes, there have been myriad challenges in the related area of statutory caps on 
non-economic damages in certain causes of actions regarding personal injury or 
medical malpractice. Judge Bough in Jiles v. Schuster Co., casted Missouri’s No 
Pay No Play as unconstitutional because it is a cap on non-economic damages pre-
vented by Watts.49 While no other state has yet related No Pay No Play statues to 
statutory caps in other fields (such as medical malpractice)50, it is helpful to review 
how statutory caps in these fields have been addressed on the national landscape. 
As of today, nine states maintain caps on non-economic damages in product liability 
 
 39. See Id. at 682. 
 40. See Id. The court argued that the government could not be the beneficiaries as the government did 
not receive the money as a fine, rather the real beneficiaries were the insured citizens and the insurers of 
the state, as indicated by a projected reduction in insurance costs to the drivers and insurance companies. 
Id. at note 12. 
 41. See Id. at 686. 
 42. See Id. at 687-88. 
 43. Caviglia v. Royals Tours of America, 842 A.2d 125, 135-136 (N.J. 2004). 
 44. Montgomery v. Potter, 341 P. 3d 660, 662 (Ok. 2014) 
 45. Id. at 660 
 46. Id. 
 47. See e.g. Progressive Sec. Ins. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675 (La. 1998); Caviglia v. Royals Tours of 
America, 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004); Montgomery v. Potter, 341 P. 3d 660 (Ok. 2014). 
 48. See Gilmore v. Page, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017); Howard v. Mulkins, No. 1716-
CV08520 (Oct. 17, 2018); Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 908 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 49. Jiles, 357 F. Supp. 3d at 916 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 50. See e.g. Progressive Sec. Ins. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675 (La. 1998); Caviglia v. Royals Tours of 
America, 842 A.2d 125 (N.J. 2004); Montgomery v. Potter, 341 P. 3d 660 (Ok. 2014). 
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cases, and 24 states maintain them in medical malpractice cases.51 In all, approxi-
mately 28 states have some sort of cap on non-economic damages in some form.52 
Several of these states have faced challenges that such caps on non-economic 
damages in  products liability or medical malpractice cases inherently violate the 
right to trial by jury, as did the court in Watts.53 Judge Bough framed the constitu-
tionality of the Missouri No Pay No Play statute by using the Watts analysis, stating 
that No Pay No Play violates this right to trial by jury under the Missouri Constitu-
tion.54 Many states that have faced challenges to these statutory caps as violative of 
the right to trial by jury in product liability or medical malpractice cases have sim-
ilar constitutional language to Missouri’s, which says, “That the right of trial by 
jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate…”55 However, the results of these 
challenges have been fairly split. 
On one hand, five states have found that statutory caps on damages violate the 
right to trial by jury because “the jury’s fact-finding function included the determi-
nation of damages. This can only lead to the conclusion that [the right to trial by 
jury]…protects the jury’s role to determine damages.”56 On the other hand, there 
have been eight states that have similar provisions in their constitutions but these 
states have determined that statutory caps on non-economic damages do not violate 
the right to trial by jury.57 In their reasoning, the jury still acts as finders of fact but 
statutory caps activate after the jury completes their constitutional role.58 Other 
states have determined the jury trial guarantee does not give the jury free reign to 
decide any fact that it wishes.59 Because of the vast differences in approaches it is 
important to specifically analyze each state’s rationale in reaching their outcome on 
their No Pay No Play statute. This article will focus on Missouri’s landmark case, 
Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers. 
III. THE WATTS EX REL WATTS V. LESTER E. COX MEDICAL CENTERS 
DECISION 
Since Judge Bough relied on Watts in his decision establishing that Missouri’s 
No Pay No Play was unconstitutional, it is important to understand the rationale 
 
 51. Rhatican, Ray, Hilburn and Non-Economic Damage Caps, 4-1 BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & TAX 
L.REV. (forthcoming Spring 2020). 
 52. Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary, CENTER FOR JUSTICE AND 
DEMOCRACY AT NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL, https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-
damages-state-law-summary#_ftnref5 (last visited March 7, 2020). 
 53. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 
So.2d 156 (Ala. 1991); Hilburn v. Enterpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019); Watts v. Lester E. Cox 
Medical Centers, 276 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 54. Gilmore v. Page, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017). 
 55. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a); see also NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 5; KAN. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 56. Sofie, 711 P.2d at 716; see also Moore, 592 So.2d at 163; Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 522-523; Smith v. 
Dep’t of Ins. 507 So. 2d 1080, 88-89 (Fla. 1987). 
 57. See Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115 (2000); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 
Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980)(overruled on other grounds by In re Stephens, 867 N.E.2d 148 (Ind. 
2007)); Gourley v. Nebraska Methodist Health Sys. Inc., 663 V.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003); Tam v. Eighth 
Jud. Dist. Ct., 358 P.2d 234, 238 (Nev. 2015); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 
2007); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992); Matter of Certif. of Questions of Law, 544 
N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996); Horton v. Oregon Health & Science Univ., 376 P.3d 998 (Or. 2016). 
 58. See e.g. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1118; Johnson, 404 N.E. 2d at 602-603. 
 59. See e.g. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 78-79; Tam, 358 P.3d at 238. 
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used by the Missouri Supreme Court in that case. Watts is of particular interest be-
cause it overturned the precedent that statutory caps on non-economic damages in 
Missouri were valid.60 In Watts, the case centered around a pregnant woman, Deb-
orah Watts, who went to the medical center for care relating to her pregnancy.61 
Complications required Deborah Watts to undergo an immediate Caesarian-section 
delivery to protect the health of the fetus.62 However, there were delays in the de-
livery and Naython Watts was born with catastrophic brain injuries.63  Deborah 
Watts sued the Medical Center alleging negligence on behalf of the doctors who 
initially saw her, as well as those doctors who delayed in completing the Caesarian-
section delivery.64 The jury determined that the Cox Medical Center was negligent 
and responsible for the brain injuries to Naython Watts and awarded $3.371 million 
in future medical damages and $1.45 million in non-economic damages.65 One of 
the main issues in the case was a statutory cap limiting the amount of non-economic 
damages in medical malpractice cases.66 This statute limited recovery to only 
$350,000 for non-economic damages.67 Deborah Watts challenged the constitution-
ality of this statute, and the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately decided that the 
statute violated the Missouri Constitution’s right to trial by jury.68 
In concluding, the court analyzed Watts’s claimed violation of the right to trial 
by jury by first deciding two questions: whether the medical negligence claim was 
included in the “right of trial by jury heretofore enjoyed” in the Missouri Constitu-
tion and then determining if statutory caps infringe on the “inviolate” right of trial 
by jury.69 The judges first looked at the text of Missouri’s Constitution. The relevant 
portion of Section 22(a) states: “That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed 
shall remain inviolate . . .”70 The court defined “heretofore enjoyed” to mean  that 
“the citizens of Missouri are entitled to a jury trial in all actions to which they would 
have been entitled when the Missouri Constitution was adopted in 1820.”71 In an-
swering the first question, the court ultimately performed extensive historical anal-
ysis.72 The court established that, at the time Missouri’s Constitution was ratified in 
1820, there was already a common law action for a civil wrong done against an-
other.73 The court additionally looked back through the English common law and 
Missouri Territory laws to determine that Missouri had indeed provided jury trials 
“in all cases of the value of one hundred dollars…if either party requires it.”74 The 
court addressed that non-economic damages were recognized by the English 
 
 60. See Adams By and Through Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. banc. 
1992). 
 61. See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 635-636 (Mo. banc. 2012) 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2019). 
 67. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 68. Id. at 648. 
 69. Id. at 637-368. 
 70. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a) (emphasis added). 
 71. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638 (quoting State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. banc 
2003)). 
 72. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
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common law to give “the sufferer pecuniary satisfaction.”75 Because of this, Debo-
rah Watts’s claim for a jury decision was appropriate in the realm of medical neg-
ligence.76 Notably, the court stressed that, at the time of the Missouri Constitution’s 
ratification, the common law did recognize judicial remittitur as a potential limit on 
jury damages.77 The court stated that by the 17th century, English common law au-
thorized judges to, “exercise control over juries…in which the verdict was incon-
sistent with the evidence.”78 The court, however, implied that this procedure was 
rarely used and precedent limited judicial interference in damages, finding, “ a com-
mon law reluctance to tamper with the jury’s constitutional role as the finder of 
fact.”79 
The next question the court addressed was whether statutory caps inherently 
violated this right as they defined it.80 First, the court established that Missouri law 
had long recognized the jury’s role was “. . . to [assess] liability and [determine] 
damages, thus fulfilling its constitutional task.”81 Despite the fact that Adams v. 
Children’s Mercy Hospital (the reigning precedent at the time) had found that non-
economic statutory caps were constitutional, that court recognized the jury’s role as 
the sole finder of fact and determiner of damages.82 It was here the Missouri Su-
preme Court found the ammunition needed to overturn Adam v. Children’s Mercy 
Hospital. The court found that the statute which placed a cap on non-economic 
damages (specifically the non-economic cap in medical malpractice cases) in-
fringed on the jury’s ability to determine necessary relief.83 While Adams had indi-
cated that the matter of the limitation was an issue of law and took place after the 
jury had fulfilled its role, the court in Watts established that such a limitation un-
dermines the jury’s basic function, determining damages, which is a part of their 
role as finders of fact.84 The court further explains that trial by jury is a fundamental 
right; if there is conflict between a fundamental constitutional right and a statute, 
“it is the statute . . . that must give way.”85 While the court was reluctant to overturn 
recent precedent as set out in Adams, the court thought it necessary since the statute 
violated a constitutional right, stating, “[m]oreover, no set of judges ought to have 
the right to tie the hands of their successors on constitutional questions, any more 
than one general assembly should those of its successors on legislative matters.”86 
Ultimately, the decision established a two-prong test to determine if a statutory cap 
on non-economic damages was in violation of the Missouri constitutional right to 
trial by jury: the first prong is whether the cause of action existed in 1820 (as it was 
“heretofore enjoyed”) and the second prong is whether the cap changed the jury’s 
constitutional role in determining damages.87 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 80. Id. at 640. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (quoting Adams by and Through Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W. 898, 907 (Mo. 
Banc 1992)). 
 83. See Id. at 642. 
 84. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 644 (quoting Mountain Grove Bank v. Douglas Cnty., 47 S.W. 944, 947 (Mo. 1898)). 
 87. See Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp.3d 908, 914-915 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
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IV.  FLAWS IN RATIONALE AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF WATTS 
In overturning Adams, the court in Watts reversed a precedent that had existed 
for 20 years, and the decision has since been used to address causes of action beyond 
medical malpractice cases.88 Because the case is referenced as the determining fac-
tor in Missouri to decide the fate of the No Pay No Play statute, one must heavily 
scrutinize the case. Potential flaws arise in the historical analysis the court used in 
defining the right of trial by jury. In Watts, the court established that to understand 
the nature of said right, one must assess the common law of Missouri at the time 
the Missouri Constitution was adopted in 1820.89 The court admits one must look 
at English common law because of the major role it played in establishing both early 
United States and Missouri common law.90 The Missouri Supreme Court then con-
cludes that this type of action for a personal wrong was recognized in English com-
mon law and jury trials were used in these types of actions.91 The Watts court missed 
an opportunity to properly analyze how English common law defined this right to 
jury trial, and to determine if there was any basis that prevented intervention into 
jury determination of damages. In Oregon, the Oregon Supreme Court took the op-
portunity to perform such analysis in Horton v. Oregon Health & Science Univer-
sity.92 It did so in response to an earlier case, Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., where 
the Supreme Court of Oregon found that statutory caps on damages were unconsti-
tutional.93 In Horton, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the Lakin court failed 
to properly analyze early United States history as well as proper English common 
law.94 This is particularly important as common law from England and the early 
United States reflects on Missouri as much as it did on Oregon, which the Watts 
court acknowledges. 95 
The Watts court lays out that medical negligence existed in English common 
law and that non-economic damages were recoverable for such actions.96 However, 
as the Horton court put it, this is not sufficient to “ . . . say what the right [of trial 
by jury] encompasses.”97 The Missouri Supreme Court in Watts analyzed Black-
stone’s writings in his Commentaries on the Laws of England and concluded that 
the jury’s right to determine damages is absolute.98 But diving further into the com-
mentary does not yield as simple of an answer as the Watts court implies. In espous-
ing the need for jury trials, Blackstone establishes that leaving decisions of law and 
fact entirely to a judge would inevitably result in bias.99 However, he also explains 
that if the decision of fact and law were left only to a jury, then the people’s deci-
sions would be capricious with a new rule of law every day.100 It was avoidance of 
 
 88. Id. at 916. 
 89. See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Horton v. Oregon Health & Science University, 376 P.3d 998, 1036-37 (Or. 2016) 
 93. 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999). 
 94. See Horton, 376 P.2d at 1040. 
 95. See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 96. See Id. 
 97. Horton, 376 P.2d at 1036. 
 98. See Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638. 
 99. See Horton, 376 P.2d at 1037 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 379 (1st ed. 1768). 
 100. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379-380 (1st 
ed. 1768). 
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these extremes that made  a procedural split so valuable to a civil jury system be-
cause 
“[A] competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by lot from 
among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth” and 
because it “preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have 
in the administration of public justice, and prevents the encroachments of the more 
powerful and wealthy citizens.”101 
But, as the court in Horton remarks, despite the benefits of such a structure to 
jury trials, there is nothing in Blackstone’s writings that indicates the existence of a 
substantive limit on courts or parliament to “define the legal principles that create 
and limit a person’s liability.”102 Nor does the division of authority Blackstone cites 
approvingly reflect a check on the law making authority of parliament.103 The ben-
efit of a jury trial in this manner was the “fair application of the law to the facts in 
an individual case, not in any limitation that the civil jury trial placed on the legis-
lature’s lawmaking authority.”104 In fact, one bit of writing from Blackstone es-
pouses the continued role of the legislature and courts: “the most powerful individ-
ual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of another’s 
right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be examined and de-
cided by twelve indifferent men . . . and that, when once the fact is ascertained, the 
law must of course redress it.”105 The fact that “ . . . the law must…redress it” im-
plies a more complicated role the common law and Parliamentary laws should play 
in these trials; it does not act as a limit as there is no mention of a specific limitation 
on that legislative power.106 English common law seemingly does not place the 
same limitations on the legislature, nor on the role of the jury in determining dam-
ages, as the Watts court does. English common law seems fairly silent on the issue 
of statutory caps but it also does not clearly establish the jury is the sole determiner 
of damages. 
This English common law spilled over into the early United States at the time 
of the writing of the Constitution. Although the Constitutional Convention initially 
recognized and included a right to trial by jury in criminal cases,107 it was not so in 
civil cases.108 It was not until near the close of the convention that the issue regard-
ing civil trials was brought up.109 Following the mention of the necessity for such a 
provision, members of the convention argued whether it was better to explicitly 
state this right, or if Congress could be trusted to establish it in certain types of 
cases. 110 In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton discusses the issue at length in the 
Federalist Papers, specifically the Federalist No. 83.111 His argument opposed in-
clusion of a right to trial by jury for civil cases in the Constitution.112 He felt jury 
 
 101. Id. at 1037-38 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
379-380 (1st ed. 1768). 
 102. Id. at 1038. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 36 P.3d 998, 1038 (Or. 2016). 
 105. Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (1st ed. 
1768) (emphasis added). 
 106. See Id. 
 107. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl. 3. 
 108. See 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 587-588 (1911). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 112. See Id. 
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trials for criminal cases would eventually fill any necessary voids.113 For him, leav-
ing out an explicit right to a jury in civil trials did not eliminate the right, rather it 
was still protected by state constitutions and by Congress who determined what type 
of civil trials juries would serve in.114 Hamilton noted that one argument for the 
right was to prevent corrupt judges and in one explicit area “[acted] as a safeguard 
against an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation.”115 But in dealing with the 
issue, Hamilton suggested that right to trial in civil cases did not act as a limitation 
on the authority of the legislature. He stated, “It is evident that it can have no influ-
ence upon the legislature, in regard to the amount of taxes to be laid, to the objects 
upon which they are to be imposed, or to the rule by which they are to be appor-
tioned.”116 This hints that Hamilton, and early thought on the issue, did not clearly 
place a limitation on the legislature in how the law is applied as the legislature still 
had some role. There is nothing that establishes that a statutory cap could not exist 
at this time. Silence in common law may indicate something did not exist at a spe-
cific time (it seems clear statutory caps were not around at this point), but one must 
not make the mistake to conclude that it could not exist. 
Of course, the right to trial by jury in civil cases was ultimately deemed neces-
sary and was included in the Bill of Rights as the 7th Amendment.117 However, this 
does not undercut the argument laid forth by Hamilton, nor clarify a jury’s role in 
these cases. The Horton court suggests that the founders felt members of the con-
vention had alternative reasons for including the 7th Amendment, namely that a jury 
in these cases would more likely favor local interests rather than foreign ones.118 
The text of 7th Amendment itself does not immediately clear up any ambiguity. The 
Amendment states, 
“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the 
rules of the common law.”119 
The exact meaning of these words was not expressly defined. It was not until 
1812 that it was made somewhat clear through judicial interpretation.120 In United 
States v. Wonson, future Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story wrote the majority 
opinion, and held that, “Beyond all question, the [right to trial by jury in civil cases] 
is not the common law of any state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the com-
mon law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence.”121 As we have 
seen, the English common law jury trials in high regard, but does not clearly address 
a legislature’s role regarding damages in such trials. To hold that this silence means 
legislative caps inevitably violate the right to trial by jury, because it infringes on 
the juries determination of damages, goes too far. 
The purpose of this historical analysis was not to definitively express what 
Missouri’s right to trial by jury in its constitution actually encompassed in 1820, 
but rather it was to show that the court in Watts lacked a deep analysis in coming to 
 
 113. See Id. 
 114. See Id. 
 115. See Id. 
 116. See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton)(emphasis in original). 
 117. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
 118. Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 36 P.3d 998, 1039-40 (Or. 2016). 
 119. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
 120. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745 (D. Mass. 1812). 
 121. Id. at 750. 
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its conclusion.122 At the very least, the issue seems debatable and the court needs a 
more in-depth analysis to explain its historical findings. One of the main issues with 
the Watts decision is that it often conflates modern day principles with those that 
existed in Missouri in 1820. The court states that analysis begins with the right as it 
existed in 1820 saying, “the scope of [Deborah] Watts’ right to a jury trial, like the 
existence of the right, also is defined by Missouri common law when the Missouri 
Constitution was adopted in 1820.”123 It is one thing to state how today’s juries in 
Missouri are the ultimate finders of fact, with finding of damages as part of their 
constitutional function,124 as opposed to saying how these rights existed at the time 
in 1820. As we have seen, the prior common law from England and the early United 
States does not clearly set out a limitation on the legislature, nor clearly establish 
the role of a jury.125 It seems incorrect to say that it is historically evident the jury 
should be the sole determiner or damages, which inevitably places a limit on a leg-
islature in establishing causes of actions. There does not seem to be such evidence 
prior to 1820 indisputably showing that determination of damages is solely in the 
hands of the jury with no input from the legislature. 
This becomes apparent in the Watts court’s analysis of judicial remittitur. Re-
mittitur is defined as “[a]n order awarding a new trial, or damages amount lower 
than that awarded by the jury. . .”126 It has been recognized federally as far back as 
1822, where Justice Story, sitting at circuit, established, “[when] the jury have com-
mitted a gross error, or have acted from improper motives, or have given damages 
excessive in relation to the person or the injury, it is as much the duty of the court 
to interfere, to prevent the [excessive damages].”127 Thus, it is incomplete to say as 
of the 1820s the jury’s role as determiner of damages is absolute with no input from 
any other bodies. If the jury was the sole determiner of damages, then even judicial 
remittitur could not exist. In Watts, the court recognized that judicial remittitur ex-
isted in the early common law of the United States and Missouri.128 The court found 
that Missouri had long recognized judicial remittitur dating back to the period im-
mediately after Missouri’s Constitution was ratified.129 More so, the Watts court 
followed U.S. Supreme Court precedent in holding that judicial remittitur was a part 
of the United States common law and part of the federal constitutional jury right.130 
However, the Watts court then found that the “precedent regarding judicial remit-
titur is inconsistent precedent . . . “131 The court reaches this conclusion by citing 
later cases showing that, eventually, Missouri began to recognize limitations on ju-
dicial use of remittitur.132 Ultimately, the Watts court found judicial remittitur is not 
a valid exercise of judicial power, using cases as recent at 1985 as its basis.133 This 
 
 122. Citation needed 
 123. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 124. Id. at 640. 
 125. Citation needed 
 126. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY “remittitur” (9th ed. 2009). 
 127. Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 761-62 (C.C.D. Mass 1822) 
 128. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 638. 
 129. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Mo. banc. 2012). (citing 
Carr & Co. v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 137, 137 (Mo. 1821); Hoyt v. Reed, 16 Mo. 294, 294 (Mo. 1852)). 
 130. Id. (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.474, 482-483 (1935)). 
 131. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Mo. banc. 2012). 
 132. Id. (citing Rodney v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 30 S.W. 150, 150 (Mo. 1895); Firestone v. Crown Ctr. 
Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. Banc 1985)). 
 133. Id. (citing Rodney v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 30 S.W. 150, 150 (Mo. 1895); Firestone v. Crown Ctr. 
Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. Banc 1985)). 
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conflation invalidates the earlier point the Watts court made: what matters is how 
the law was defined in 1820, not how it is defined in the modern day. The common 
law has changed since 1820, that much is clear. Without a more extensive historical 
analysis, it seems imprecise to say that later standards applied the same as in 1820, 
especially given how earlier cases, much closer to the Missouri Constitution ratifi-
cation date, upheld judicial remittitur. 
Indeed, the Watts court cites this remittitur precedent (as finding it an invalid 
use of judicial power) as a “long-standing reluctance in the common law to tamper 
with the jury’s constitutional role as the finder of fact.”134 It is “long standing” from 
a modern viewpoint, it was not “long standing” in 1820. This article takes the stance 
that the court in Watts recognizes this, because rather than continuing to address 
judicial remittitur it simply moves on to conclude, “history demonstrates that statu-
tory caps on damage awards did not exist and were not contemplated by the com-
mon law when the people of Missouri adopted their constitution in 1820…” and 
“the right to trial by jury ‘heretofore enjoyed’ was not subject to legislative limits 
on damages.”135 However, this too is conflating the issue that silence in the common 
law necessarily means there can be no statutory caps on damages. Asking only if 
statutory caps existed at the time of Missouri’s ratifying its constitution is too lim-
ited a question. The better question is to ask whether any limitations on a jury’s 
finding of damages existed in 1820 Missouri. Any limitation that existed in 1820 
would cast doubt on the courts finding that it is the jury’s absolute and sole right to 
determine damages.136 It is clear that judicial limitation through remittitur ex-
isted,137 dating all the way back to 1820,138 no matter how more modern courts view 
their use. This begs the question, if judicial limitations existed, why can there not 
be statutory limitations on damages? Again, a historical analysis reveals no express 
mention of legislative limitations on a jury’s determination of damages, nor that the 
jury holds the right alone. The weakness in the Watts decision is that its limited 
historical analysis overturns a 20-year precedent that had validated statutory caps 
on non-economic damages.139 This is the foundation of the dissent in Watts, which 
finds that there is no conclusive reason to overturn precedent.140 The dissent con-
tinues that statutory caps had been found constitutional in other jurisdictions and 
that there must be more to overturn Adams.141 It is this weakness that should lead 
Missouri courts to question Watts, should cases involving No Pay No Play (or sim-
ilar issues) reach them. 
 
 134. Id. at 639. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Mo. banc. 2012)(the 
court implies that damage determination in an action is limited only to the jury’s findings.) 
 137. See e.g. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.474, 482-483 (1935); Hoyt v. Reed, 16 Mo. 294, 294 (Mo. 
1852). 
 138. Carr & Co. v. Edwards, 1 Mo. 137, 137 (Mo. 1821). 
 139. See Adams by and Through Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W. 898 (Mo. banc 1992). 
 140. Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 649 (Mo. banc. 2012)(Russell, 
M., dissenting). 
 141. Id. at 650-652(Russell, M. dissenting). 
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V. IS THE NO PAY NO PLAY STATUTE DOOMED? 
Given how the No Pay No Play statute has been addressed in trial courts, it 
seems a decision by the Missouri Supreme Court is necessary.142 These cases find-
ing No Pay No Play unconstitutional have followed the precedent established by 
Watts, and do not challenge any findings from the Missouri Supreme Court. As-
suming the Missouri Supreme Court chooses to follow the Watts precedent, will the 
No Pay No Play statute be found unconstitutional? Using Jiles as a guide to how 
the Missouri Supreme Court may rule, the answer seems to be yes.143 In Jiles, Judge 
Bough found that the civil action for an automobile accident existed in 1820, as it 
fell under the umbrella of negligence and “personal wrong”, thus satisfying the first 
prong from Watts.144 No Pay No Play also satisfies the second prong of Watts, be-
cause the total limitation of non-economic damages for the uninsured driver acts as 
a statutory cap on a jury’s determination of damages similar to the caps in medical 
malpractice cases from Watts.145 If such a case reaches the Missouri Supreme Court, 
assuming the court chooses to continue current precedent, it is likely that the No 
Pay No Play statute will be found unconstitutional. 
However, despite this, the Missouri Supreme Court could distinguish the No 
Pay No Play statue from the result in Watts. As we have seen, the Watts decision 
created a two-prong test for determining if a statutory limitation on a cause of action 
violates the right to trial by jury: First, the cause of action must have existed back 
in 1820 at common law, and second, the limitation must interfere with the jury’s 
determination of damages.146 There have been subsequent cases that have used this 
analysis in distinguishing themselves from Watts.147 The first case, Dieser v. St. 
Anthony’s Medical Center, was distinguished by a finding that post-judgment inter-
est was not something created by a common law cause of action in 1820.148 Rather, 
post judgment interest was something created by statute after 1820, and thus its 
restriction in medical negligence cases does not directly curtail a jury’s determina-
tion of damages. Hence, the legislature could limit post-judgment interest in these 
types of cases.149 In the next case, Dodson v. Ferrara, the Missouri Supreme Court 
determined that in wrongful death cases the legislature can impose statutory caps 
on non-economic damages.150 Its reasoning was that “wrongful death” was separate 
from the “personal wrong” as set out in Watts.151 Since this cause of action, wrong-
ful death, was not recognized until it was later implemented by statute, it did not 
exist at common law in 1820 and was thus did not violate the right to trial by jury 
as “heretofore enjoyed.”152 One of the most interesting aspects of the case was the 
Equal Protection analysis done after the court concluded that limitation in wrongful 
 
 142. See Gilmore v. Page, No. 17PT-CC00092 (July 31, 2017); Howard v. Mulkins, No. 1716-
CV08520 (Oct. 17, 2018); Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 908 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 143. See Jiles, 357 F. Supp.3d at 916. 
 144. Id. at 914. 
 145. Id. at 916. 
 146. Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 908, 914-915 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 147. See Dodson v. Ferrara, 497 S.W.3d 542, 556 (Mo. banc 2016); Dieser v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 
498 S.W.3d 419, 433-434 (Mo. banc 2016). 
 148. Dieser, 498 S.W.3d at 426-427. 
 149. Id. at 433-434. 
 150. Dodson, 497 S.W.3d at 555. 
 151. See Id. at 555-556. 
 152. See Dodson v. Ferrara, 497 S.W.3d 542, 555-556 (Mo. banc 2016). 
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death cases did not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury.153 In that analysis, 
the court found that such a statutory limitation did not invalidate a fundamental right 
or create a suspect group classification.154 The law would be upheld on rational basis 
review if there was any legitimate state interest in the law, notwithstanding personal 
feelings on the statute.155 The court found that the state’s interest in rising medical 
malpractice insurance was enough to survive rational basis review.156 It is possible 
that the Missouri Supreme Court could find No Pay No Play, an affirmative defense, 
falls outside of potential common law causes of action from 1820 since it is after 
the advent of automobiles. However, based on Judge Bough’s analysis in Jiles, this 
is unlikely.157 If the court turns to an Equal Protection analysis, it is possible they 
find rising insurance costs are enough to withstand rational basis review, much like 
the court in Progressive Sec. Ins. v. Foster. 158 
It is important to recognize that Watts did not invalidate the legislature’s ability 
to create a statutory cause of action,159 nor does it necessarily diminish their ability 
to eliminate causes of action.160 This is noticeable in the revival of Missouri Statute 
§538.210, which was revised in 2015 and re-established statutory caps on non-eco-
nomic damages in medical malpractice claims.161 Interestingly, it is eerily similar 
to the statute found unconstitutional in Watts.162 The Senate bill that effectuated the 
change made a major adjustment to another statute, §1.010.163 The original section 
of §1.010 read, 
1. The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made 
prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, which 
are not local to that kingdom and not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Consti-
tution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force 
for the time being, are the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or 
usage to the contrary notwithstanding, but no act of the general assembly or law of 
this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the courts of 
this state, for the reason that it is in derogation of, or in conflict with, the common 
law, or with such statutes or acts of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, 
or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning 
thereof.164 
The interesting part of the Senate Bill in 2015 added a second clause to this 
statute, that was adopted into the current law, which reads, 
“The general assembly expressly excludes from this section the common law 
of England as it relates to claims arising out of the rendering of or failure to render 
 
 153. See Id. at 559-560. 
 154. See Id. 
 155. See Id. 
 156. See Id. at 561. 
 157. See Jiles v. Schuster Co., 357 F. Supp. 3d 908, 914-915 (W.D. Mo. 2018). 
 158. Progressive Sec. Ins. v. Foster, 711 So. 2d 675, 682 (La. 1998) 
 159. See Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 205 (Mo. banc 2012); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 
832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. banc 1992); Dodson v. Ferrara, 497 S.W.3d 542, 555-556 (Mo. banc 2016). 
 160. See Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907. 
 161. See MO. REV. STAT. § 528.210 cl.1 (2019). 
 162. See Watts ex rel Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 276 S.W.3d 633, 640 (Mo. banc 2012). 
 163. S.B. 239, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 164. MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 cl.1 (2015). 
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health care services by a health care provider, it being the intent of the general as-
sembly to replace those claims with statutory causes of action.”165 
This lead to a statutorily created cause of action for medical malpractice claims, 
retaining statutory caps on non-economic damages.166 Since the legislature has cre-
ated this “new” cause of action, Watts analysis would no longer apply.167 This poses 
potentially good news to the No Pay No Play statute because, even if initially found 
unconstitutional, altering or creating a new statutory cause of action in specific un-
insured motorist automobile accidents may see the No Pay No Play statute substan-
tively survive. Similar rewording in §1.010 from the 2015 Senate Bill seems neces-
sary to reestablish the No Pay No Play statute. Such legislative collaboration to 
achieve this result may seem unlikely, but when the No Pay No Play statute was 
originally passed in the legislature it had strong support, even surviving a guberna-
torial veto.168 This level of support may lead the legislature to do much the same as 
it did for § 568.210, create a new statutory cause of action that eliminates the orig-
inal common law cause of action. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Missouri sits at a precipice of deciding the fate of its No Pay No Play statute. 
While Missouri would not be the first state to find their No Pay No Play statute 
unconstitutional, it would be the first to do so under the right to trial by jury. This 
could have effects on other states that have No Pay No Play statutes, especially 
those with similarly worded provisions regarding the right to trial by jury in their 
constitutions. If any of these states have already placed limitation on statutory caps 
in other causes of action, they could use Missouri as evidence to invalidate their 
own No Pay No Play statues. The Missouri Supreme Court in Watts found that Mis-
souri’s right to trial by jury inherently invalidated any statutory limitation on dam-
ages as long as the cause of action existed in 1820 and the statute violated jury’s 
determination of damages. 
While Watts remains unchallenged precedent, the decision seems historically 
flawed and is in need of close scrutiny to determine whether it should remain the 
law of Missouri. Watts does not truly analyze the history of English common law 
and United States common law as it applied to the right of trial by jury as enshrined 
by the Missouri Constitution. The decision also makes the mistake of conflating 
modern precedent with common law as it existed in 1820, when the Missouri Con-
stitution was ratified. The court misconstrues that since statutory caps did not exist 
in 1820, that they could not exist. Silence in common law should not construed in 
this manner without close scrutiny. 
 
 165. See S.B. 239, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); see also MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 cl.2 
(2019). 
 166. See MO. REV. STAT. § 528.210 cl.1. For comparison, here is the original language as it appeared 
in 2005, “In any action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury or death arising 
out of the rendering of or the failure to render health care services, no plaintiff shall recover more than 
three hundred fifty thousand dollars  per occurrence for noneconomic damages from any one defendant 
as defendant is defined in subsection 2 of this section irrespective of the number of defendants. See MO. 
REV. STAT. § 528.210 cl.1 (2005). 
 167. See Dodson v. Ferrara, 497 S.W.3d 542, 556 (Mo. banc 2016); Dieser v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 
498 S.W.3d 419, 433-434 (Mo. banc 2016). 
 168. See H.B. 339, 97th Gen. Asssemb., reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). 
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However, while Watts is a flawed decision, it remains the law of the state. It 
seems evident, from cases like Jiles, that the No Pay No Play statute is likely to be 
found unconstitutional using this Watts analysis. This does not necessarily spell the 
end of the No Pay No Play statute in Missouri. Future cases have distinguished other 
specific causes of action and defenses that do not fall under the Watts analysis. The 
Missouri Supreme Court may determine the No Pay No Play statute should also be 
distinguished. Lastly, the legislature has recently adopted statutes that eliminate 
common law causes of action and create statutory causes of action in its place.169 
This was used to resurrect statutory caps on non-economic damages in medical mal-
practice claims, and the overwhelming support for the No Pay No Play statue among 
the legislature during its passage may lend it to such treatment170. It is important to 
watch how the Missouri Supreme Court would address the issue and if there would 
be any response from the Missouri legislature. 
Retaining the No Pay No Play statute is important to reduce the potential costs 
of uninsured motorists on Missouri roads.171 Even reducing the number of uninsured 
motorists by a small amount may reduce both the cost of insurance and litigation.172 
It also serves to further ensure compliance with Missouri laws.  Harsher punish-
ments have worked to reduce the number of drunk drivers on the road and their 
impact173 and there is evidence to show that No Pay No Play statutes can reduce the 
number of uninsured drivers, even if by only a modest amount.174 
 
 
 169. Compare Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. banc 1992) with MO. 
REV. STAT. § 528.210 cl.1 (2005) and MO. REV. STAT. § 1.010 cl.1. 
 170. See H.B. 339, 97th Gen. Asssemb., reg. Sess. (Mo. 2013). There was enough support for No Pay 
No Play to survive a gubernatorial veto from then Governor, Jay Nixon. 
 171. MO Insurance Market Review, supra note 2. 
 172. See Id.; New Study Finds Properly Enforced No Pay, No Play Laws Moderately Reduce Uninsured 
Motorists and May Also Trim Auto Insurance Costs, INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (Dec.  4, 2012), 
https://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/NoPayNewsRelease_Final.pdf. 
 173. Benjamin Hansen, Punishment and Deterrence: Evidence from Drunk Driving, 105(a) Am. Econ. 
Rev. 1581, 1592 (2015). 
 174. New Study Finds Properly Enforced No Pay, No Play Laws Moderately Reduce Uninsured Mo-
torists and May Also Trim Auto Insurance Costs, INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL (Dec.  4, 2012), 
https://www.insurance-research.org/sites/default/files/downloads/NoPayNewsRelease_Final.pdf. 
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